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Abstract: A multivariate spatial autoregressive model of local public expenditure
determination with autoregressive disturbance is developed and estimated in this paper.
The empirical model is developed on the principles of utility maximization of a strictly
quasi concave community utility function. The existence of spatial interdependence is
tested using Moran’s I statistic and Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for both the spatial
error and spatial lag models. The full model is estimated by efficient GMM following
Kelejian and Prucha’s (1998) approach using county-level data from 418 Appalachian
counties. The results indicate the existence of significant spillover effects among local
governments with respect to spending in local public services. The OLS estimates of the
conventional (non spatial) model of local public expenditure determination and the
corresponding maximum likelihood estimates of the spatial lag and the spatial error
models are also presented for comparison purposes. The GMM estimates are found to be
more efficient.
Key Words: Appalachia, spatial, autoregressive, GMM, public services, spatial lag
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County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services in Appalachia: A
Multivariate Spatial Autoregressive Model Approach
Introduction
The public sector interacts with the private sector and affects the economic well
being of individuals in many ways. For example, in an effort to create jobs, spur income
growth, and enhance economic opportunities of their citizens more generally, state and
local governments often offer newly locating or expanding business firms substantial
financial incentives (Gabe and Bell, 2004). The distribution of income, the overall price
level, and the quality and quantity of public goods and services such as highways,
education, health and other local public services are also affected by local government
activities such as taxes, and other public expenditure. The level of public expenditure
and tax revenue in turn are determined by the economic, demographic and political
characteristics of the local economy.
The standard model in the literature assumes that the differences in local public
expenditures across regions are generally explained by differences in county-level
covariates such as per capita income, population density, tax base, tax rates, population
size, age structure of the population, grants in-aid from higher levels of governments,
labor market characteristics, and school-age population as well as other socio-economic
and institutional factors.
Although most empirical studies in the local public finance literature assume that
the level of public expenditure in a jurisdiction is not affected by the expenditures in
neighboring jurisdictions, both economic theory and causal observations, however,
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suggest that expenditure spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by
local governments.
In this paper, an empirical model that incorporates expenditure spillovers into the
conventional model of local public spending determination is developed. The idea that
county j’s local public spending is dependent on its neighbors’ spending on public
services and this dependency is tested using county-level data from Appalachia.
Neighbors are defined as those counties who share common geographic borders, although
it is recognized that economic or demographic similarities could also define
neighborliness.
A literature review on the determinants of local public expenditure and the
econometric model is presented in the following section. A theoretical model of local
public expenditure determination based upon the median-voter model of utility
maximization is developed. The basic model is expanded to incorporate spatial spillover
effects. Test statistics are developed to test the existence of spatial dependences as well as
to discriminate between the spatial lag and the spatial error dependences. The
specification of the empirical models and issues related to their estimation are also
discussed in detail. Description of the data and its sources, the results, discussion, and the
conclusion are also presented accordingly.
County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services
Many cross-sectional studies exist in the literature trying to explain regional
variations in per capital local public expenditures (Hawley, 1957; Brazer, 1959; Hirsch,
1959; Hansen, 196; Henderson, 1968; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Ohls and Wales,
1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982; Fisher
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and Navin, 1992). Hawley (1957), Brazer (1959), Hirsch (1959), and Hansen (1965), for
example, employed a one-equation multiple-regression model to express per capita local
public expenditure as a function of selected explanatory variables using cross-sectional
data. Henderson (1968) also used a multiple-regression analysis of per capita crosssectional county data for the United States with two equations. Borcherding and Deacon
(1972) estimated demand functions for eight specific public services: local education,
higher education, highways, health and hospitals, police, fire, sewers and sanitation using
cross-sectional data aggregated at state level. Using cross-sectional expenditure data for
1968, Ohls and Wales (1972) also estimated the demand and cost functions for three
broad categories of state and local public expenditure: expenditures on highways per
capita, education expenditures per school-age population and local service expenditures
per capita (including fire, police, sanitation, health and hospitals, and local utility
expenditure).
Similarly, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) employed multiple-regression analysis
to estimate the demand functions for three categories of municipal services: police, parks
and recreation, and total municipal expenditure excluding education and welfare. These
studies are based on the median voter theory where individual demand functions are
inferred from cross-sectional studies in which actual public expenditure by local
governments are regressed on indicators of economic and social composition of the
jurisdiction’s population. Bergstrom et al. (1982), however, devised and applied a method
for estimating demand for local public goods, which does not require the median voter
assumption. By combining individual’s responses from survey data to questions about
whether they want more or less of various public goods with observations of their
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incomes, tax rates, and of actual spending in their home communities to obtain estimates
of demand functions.
The results from the various studies show that the income elasticity of local public
expenditure is positive and significant whereas the estimates of tax price elasticity are
negative and significant (Henderson, 1968; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Ohls and
Wales, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Bergstrom et al., 1982; Sanz and
Velazquez, 2002; Painter and Bae, 2001). Studies by Randolph et al. (1996), Canning and
Pedroni (1999) and Fay (2000) also found that spending on economic services such as
those relating to transport and communications respond primarily and directly to per
capita income changes. Similarly, wide varieties of studies show that estimates of income
elasticity greater than one for merit goods such as health, education and housing (Lue,
1986; Newhouse, 1987; Gertham, Sogaard et al., 1992; Falch and Rattso, 1997; Snyder
and Yachovlev, 2002; Hashmati, 2001). Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) analyzed the
linkage between public infrastructure and regional development in a system of two
equations and found that per capita real personal income has a positive and statistically
significant contemporaneous effect on local public investment.
The findings from the study by Painter and Bae (2001) indicates that income per
capita, total long-term debt, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of students of
college age have a positive and statistically significant impact on state government
expenditure. The results from this study and others (Randolph et al., 1996; Gertham et
al., 1992; Falch and Rattso, 1997; Fay, 2000; Hashmati, 2001) also show that population
density has negative coefficient. Population and its density play an important role in per
capita spending on the purest or non-rival goods such as transportation and
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communications as well as merit goods and other economic services. A negative
coefficient, thus, indicates the advantage of economies of scale in the provision of these
public services. A small community must provide many public services such as
education, hospitals, police protection, and sewage removal at relatively high per capita
costs, which decline as its population increases. The reverse also holds true that large
expenditures result in places with declining population (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973).
This is one of the significant problems that small rural communities face. Larger
communities usually have better taxable capacity, which can provide a broader range of
services that a small community cannot or need not provide (Henderson, 1968).
Since net migration changes the size and the density of population of a region, it
has an impact on the demand of locally provided public goods and services as well as on
the revenues that support the provision of these public goods and services. The mix of
migrants or the mix of individuals who choose not to migrate may have profound
consequences on the local public sector. A high-income in-migrant family, for example,
may provide more tax revenue to the local economy than a low-income in-migrant
family. The type and the quantity of public services they demand, however, are likely to
be different. Similarly, growth in population of children that results from in-migrant
families with children or women likely to have children creates increased pressure on to
expand services. At the same time, excess capacity and maintenance costs of school
buildings in the areas of out-migration will be created. The problems are exacerbated if
out-migration is severe to impact property value and overall fiscal health of the
community (Charney, 1993).
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The population age structure is also a significant determinant of local public
services and goods.

An increase in the proportion of the old and the young in a

community increase spending in health, housing and social security (Heller, Hemming
and Kalvert, 1986; Hagmann and Nicolleti, 1989; Di Matteo and Di Matteo 1998; Curie
and Yelowtz, 2000). An increase in the proportion of young people will also generate
pressure for increases in public spending on education (Marlow and Shiers, 1999; Alhin
and Johansson, 2001). Local public expenditure per capita is also positively related to
grants in-aid from higher-level governments (Fisher and Navin, 1992; Henderson, 1968).
Spatial spillovers in public expenditure might be due to policy interdependence
between local governments or it might simply be due to the fact that local governments
are hit by a spatially auto-correlated shocks. Thus, local governments affect each other in
their public spending decisions, and as Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) indicate, not
accounting for such spillover effects would result in biased and inconsistent estimates of
the parameters of the demand equation for local public services.
One way of explaining and testing the existence of spatial interactions among
local governments is through the tax competition model. This model assumes that local
governments finance public spending through a tax on mobile capital and since the level
of tax base in a jurisdiction depends both on own and on other jurisdictions’ tax rates,
strategic interactions results (Wildasin, 1986). Local governments are, thus, concerned
about how their tax rates and local public expenditure compare with those of their
neighboring jurisdictions. The reason for this concern could be the fear of driving away
taxpayers and attracting welfare recipient from other jurisdictions if benefits are
generous. Local governments may react to the actions of their neighbors asymmetrically
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or complementarily. The study by Figlio et al. (1999) on a panel of United States, for
example, found that decentralized welfare benefit setting exacerbates inter-state
competition that might induce states to respond to changes in their neighbor’ policies
asymmetrically. In a study of California cities, Bruerckner (1998), however, found that a
city government raises land rent both in its own and in neighboring cities by restricting
the amount of developable land, thereby generating an externality and strategic
interaction in growth control decisions (policy interdependence).
The other model that tries to explain and test the existence of spatial interactions
among local governments is the externality or spill-over effect model. This model
postulates that beneficial or harmful effect could spillover onto residents of neighboring
jurisdiction from expenditures on local public service in a given jurisdiction. Using a
model of spatially correlated random effect, Case et al. (1993), for example, found that
states’ per capita expenditures are positively and significantly influenced by their
neighbors’ spending and that omitting this spillover effect from the analysis would result
in biased estimates of the effects of other covariates on state spending. Using United
States county-level data, Kelejian and Robinson (1993) also found that police
expenditures in a given county are positively and significantly influenced by neighboring
counties’ expenditure on police protection.
The third model that tries to explain and test the existence of spatial interactions
among local governments is the “political agency – yardstick competition” model. This
model postulates that imperfectly informed voters in a given jurisdiction use the
performance of other governments as a yardstick to evaluate their own governments.
Thus, local governments react to the actions of their neighbors in an effort not to get too
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far out of line with policies in other jurisdictions, resulting in local governments
mimicking each other’s behavior. Besley and Case (1995) found evidence of this
“political agency – yardstick competition”. They tested their yardstick competition
hypothesis on United States’ income taxes from 1960 to 1988 and found that geographic
neighbors’ tax changes have a positive and significant effect on a given state’s tax
change.
Methodology
Model Formation
Following the studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973), the median voter model will be used to analyze the determinants of the
demand for local public services or the expenditures for local public services. In this
model it is assumed that utility-maximizing citizens elect government by majority rule
and that the size of the public sector is the only issue to be decided. Citizens are assumed
to be informed about the costs and benefits of government expenditures and hence the
median voter chooses the level of spending by voting for candidates who offer him/her
the most efficient set of public services and taxes. Aggregating over individual in a
community, a utility function that represents community preferences can be generated.
Based on these assumptions, a theoretical model is developed to test the hypotheses of
the determinants of public spending on local public services. The model is given by the
following set of equations:
U = U ( G,INCTAXR;X )

(1a)

DGEX = DGEX ( G,GF )

(1b)

REV = REV ( INCTAXR, PCTAX, PCPTAX, DFEG;X )

(1c)
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REV = DGEX

(1d)

Equation (1a) is the community utility function which is assumed to be strictly quasiconcave over local public services (G), community income tax rate (INCTAXR), and also
may depend on socio-economic, demographic and amenity variables (X). Equation (1b)
is local government expenditure function (DGEX), which depends on G and other local
government functions (GF). Equation (1c) represents local government revenue function,
which is assumed to depend upon the community income tax rate (INCTAXR), the tax
base that includes personal income tax (PCTAX) and property tax (PCPTAX),
intergovernmental grants (DFEG) and a vector of other socio-economic, demographic
and amenity variables (X). Equation (1d) is local government budget constraint, which
states that local government revenue (REV) should equal to local government
expenditure (DGEX). Maximizing the utility function given in (1a) with respect to G, GF
and INCTAXR subject to (1b)-(1d), gives a local public services demand function of the
form (all other notations as defined before)
G = G ( PCTAX, PCPTAX, DFEG;X )

(2a)

Substituting in (4.b) gives the reduced form of local public services expenditure demand
function as follows:
DGEX = DGEX ( PCTAX, PCPTAX, DFEG;X )

(2b)

Equation (2b) forms the basis for the empirical analysis. In order to reduce the effects of
the large diversity found in the data used in empirical analysis, a multiplicative (loglinear) form of the model is used. Such specification also implies a constant-elasticity
form for the equilibrium conditions given in (2b). A log-linear (i.e., log-log)
representation of this equilibrium condition can thus be expressed as:
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K

DGEXit = ( PCTAXit ) × ( PCPTAXit ) × ( DFEG it ) × ∏ ( X kit ) k
a

b

c

x

k =1

K

→ ln ( DGEXit ) = aln ( PCTAXit ) + bln ( PCPTAXit ) + cln ( DFEG it ) + ∑ xk ln ( X kit )

(3a)

k =1

Where a, b, c and xk , k = 1,..., K are exponents with K being the total number of variables
included in vector X. The log-linear specification has an advantage of yielding a loglinear reduced form for estimation, where the estimated coefficients represent elasticities.
Duffy-Deno (1998) and MacKinnon, White et al., 1983 also showed that, compared to a
linear specification, a log-linear specification is more appropriate for models involving
population and employment densities.
The empirical model that corresponds to equation (3a) can be expressed more
compactly as follows:

y = Xβ + u

(3b)

Where y is (Nx1) vector of the log of per capita local public expenditure, X is (NxK)
matrix of explanatory variables in log, β is (Kx1) vector of parameters to be estimated,
and u is an error term that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across the observations. Equation (3b), however, may not be correctly specified due to
the presence of spatial autocorrelation in local public expenditures because of policy
interdependence among local governments. A possible reason for policy interdependence
in local public expenditure is the existence of spillover effects across jurisdictions.
Commuters, for example, use public transportation, roads, recreation and cultural
facilities in their working communities. Air pollution controls and sewage treatment
enhance the environmental quality of neighboring jurisdictions, and educational and job
training expenditures may lead to productivity gain in workplaces outside the community.
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The presence of spatial spillover demands the explicit modeling of the spatial
interactions, by taking into account that local jurisdictions make their decisions
simultaneously, and each local government takes its neighbors’ behavior into account
when setting its own policy. Thus, equation (3b) should be extended to accommodate this
spatial interdependence as follows:

y = ρWy + Xβ + u

(3c)

where y is an (Nx1) vector of observations on the dependent variable, Wy is the
corresponding spatial lagged dependent variable for weights matrix W, X is (Nx K)
matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, u is an (n x 1) vector of error terms,

ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter and β is a (Kx1) vector of regression
coefficients. The parameter ρ measures the degree of spatial dependence inherent in the
data. As this model combines the standard regression model with a spatially lagged
dependent variable, it is also called a mixed regressive-spatial autoregressive model
(Anselin and Bera, 1998).
Equation (3b) may not also be correctly specified due to spatial autocorrelation in
the error term. Thus, a second way to incorporate spatial autocorrelation in a regression
model is to specify a spatial process for the disturbance term. The disturbance terms in a
regression model can be considered to contain all ignored elements, and when spatial
dependence is present in the disturbance term, the spatial effects are assumed to be a
white noise, or perturbation, that is, a factor that needs to be removed (Anselin, 2001).
For example, any spatially auto-correlated variable that has an influence on y and is
omitted from the model will lead to a spatial dependence in the residual. Such spatial
pattern in the residuals of the regression model may lead to the discovery of additional
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variables that should be included in the model. Local jurisdictions may also be subjected
to shocks that affect their expenditure decisions, and are spatially auto-correlated – such
as common shocks to income and tax base, that may result from central government
regional policies or intermediate level of government fiscal policies. Spatial dependence
in the disturbance term also violates the basic OLS estimation assumption of uncorrelated
errors. Hence, when the spatial dependence is ignored, OLS estimates will be inefficient,
though unbiased, the student t- and F-statistics for tests of significance will be biased, the
R2 measure will be misleading, which in turn lead to a wrong statistical interpretation of
the regression mode (Anselin, Bera, Florax and Yoon, 1996). More efficient estimators
can be obtained by taking advantage of the particular structure of the error covariance
implied by the spatial process. The disturbance term is non-spherical where the offdiagonal elements of the associated covariance matrix express the structure of spatial
dependence. The spatial dependence in the disturbance term, thus, can be expressed using
matrix notation as:

y = Xβ + u
With

(3d)

u = λWu + ε

Where u is assumed to follow a spatial autoregressive process, with λ as the spatial
autoregressive coefficient for the error lag Wu, and ε is (Nx1) vector of innovations or
white noise error, and the other notations as defined before. Equation (3d) is the structural
form of the SAR model which expresses global spatial effects. The corresponding
reduced form of the model can be specified as:

y = Xβ + ( I − λ W ) ε
−1

(3e)

With the corresponding error covariance matrix given as
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E ( uu′ ) = σ 2 ( I − λ W )

−1

( I − λ W′ )

−1

−1
= σ 2 ( I − λ W )′ ( I − λ W )

(3f)

The structure in equation (3f) shows that the spatial error process leads to a non-zero
error covariance between every pair of observation, but decreasing in magnitude with the
order of contiguity. Note also that hetroskedasticity is induced in u, irrespective of the
hetroskedasticity of ε , because the inverse matrices in equation (3f) yields non-constant
diagonal element in the error covariance matrix.

Diagnostics for Spatial Autocorrelation
When there are no strong a priori theoretical reasons to believe that interdependences
between spatial units arises either due to the spatial lags of the dependent variables or due
to spatially autoregressive error terms, the standard approach is to model the system with
both effects included (Anselin, 2003). There are, however, a number of diagnostic tests
that can be applied to discriminate between the two forms of the spatial dependence
described by equations (3c) and (3d). The most widely used diagnostic test for spatial
dependence in a regression model is an application of the Moran’s I statistic to the
residuals of an OLS regression. Given a row-standardized spatial weight matrix W
Moran’s I on the OLS residuals of equation (3a) is given by:

I (e) =

e′′We
e′e

Where e are the OLS residuals. Although Moran’s I statistic has great power in detecting
misspecifications in the model (and not only spatial autocorrelation), it is less helpful in
suggesting which alternative specification should be used. To this end, two sets of
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics are used.
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The first set, LM-Lag and Robust LM-Lag, pertain to the spatial lag model as the
alternative. These are given as follows:

LM ( Lag ) =

⎛ e′Wy ⎞
⎜
⎟
⎝ ( e′e ) N ⎠

2

(WXb )′ M (WXb ) + tr W ′W + W 2
(
)
( e′e ) N
2

RLM ( Lag )

⎡ e′Wy
e′We ⎤
−
⎢
( e′e ) N ( e′e ) N ⎥⎦
⎣
=
(WXb )′ M (WXb ) + tr
( e′e ) N

Where tr is the matrix trace operator, M = I − X ( X ′X ) X ′ and b is the OLS estimate of
−1

β in equation (3a).
The second set, LM-Error and Robust LM-Error), refer to the spatial error model as the
alternative. These are given by:
2

LM ( Lag )

RLM ( err ) =

⎛ e′We ⎞
⎜
⎟
( e′e ) N ⎠
⎝
=
tr (W ′W + W 2 )

−1
⎡
⎤
⎛ WXb ′ M WXB
⎞
′
(
)
(
)
e
We
e′Wy ⎥
⎢
⎜
⎟
− tr
+ tr
⎢ ( e′e ) N
e′e ) N
⎜
⎟ ( e′e ) N ⎥
(
⎝
⎠
⎣⎢
⎦⎥

⎛
⎞
′
2 ⎜ (WXb ) M (WXB )
+ tr ⎟
tr − tr
e′e ) N
⎜
⎟
(
⎝
⎠

2

−1

Both sets of Lagrange Multiplier test statistics are distributed as χ 2 with one degree of
freedom. Note that the robust versions of the statistics are considered only when the
standard versions (LM-Lag or LM-Error) are significant.

A rejection of the null
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hypothesis by LM-Lag and LM-Error test statistics, thus, requires the consideration of the
robust versions of the statistics.

Estimation Methods
The existence of spatial dependence in the data set is tested by Moran’s I test statistic and
its high significance shows an indication that spatial autocorrelation exists in the data set.
Although Moran’s I statistic is powerful in detecting spatial misspecifications in the data
set, it could not, however, discriminate the form of the spatial dependence. The Lagrange
Multiplier test statistics is done to discriminate between the spatial lag and the spatial
error dependences. Since the ML-Lag and ML-Error are highly significant which lead to
the rejection of the null hypothesis of absence of spatial dependence, the robust forms of
the statistics has to be considered. RML-Error is more significant than RML-Lag
(p<0.0000 compared to p<0.0445). From this result it can be inferred that the spatial error
specification of the model is more appropriate. Such models can be estimated
consistently by maximum likelihood estimator provided that the error terms are normally
distributed. A number of studies have used this method (see Case et al., 1993; Brueckner,
1998, 2000; Baicker, 2005; Saavedra, 2000).

In this study, however, the normally

distributed error term assumption upon which the maximum likelihood estimation is
based is not fulfilled. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is highly significant (p<0.0000) which
lead to reject the null hypotheses of normally distributed error term. Besides, maximum
likelihood estimation is computationally expensive and is subjected to the identification
problem as a result of the need to estimate the too many parameters of the n x n
disturbance covariance matrix from only cross-sectional data. Thus, maximum likelihood
estimation may not give consistent and unbiased estimates of parameters of the model.
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A better alternative is the use of instrumental variables, as suggested by Kelejian
and Robinson (1993), Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003). This approach is
computationally easier to implement and it does not require distributional assumptions on
the error term. Thus, the model is also estimated by generalized spatial two-stage least
squares (GS2SLS) as a better alternative. To this end, the model is specified as a spatial
autoregressive

model

with

autoregressive disturbances by incorporating both

dependences. Thus, by combining equations (3c) and (3d), the empirical model for a
cross-section of counties of Appalachia is expressed as:
y = ρ Wy + Xβ + u

With

(4)

u = λWu + ε

where y is an (418x1) vector of direct local government expenditure per capita, Wy is the
corresponding spatial lagged dependent variable for weights matrix W, X is (418x K)
matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, ρ is the spatial autoregressive
parameter, β is a (Kx1) vector of regression coefficients, u is an (418x1) vector of error
terms, that is assumed to follow a spatial autoregressive process, with λ as the spatial
autoregressive coefficient for the error lag Wu, and ε is (418x1) vector of innovations or
white noise error. A row standardized queen-based contiguity weights matrix W is used.
Since the right-hand side spatial lag dependent variable (Wy) is correlated with the error
term, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cannot give consistent estimates of the parameters of
equation (4) as it stands. The reduced form of the system in (4) is non-linear in
parameters and can be given by:

y = ( I n − ρW ) X β + ( I n − ρW )
−1

−1

−1
( I n − λW ) ε

(5)
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Equation (5) cannot be estimated consistently by OLS either.
Thus, the parameters of the model given in (4) are estimated using efficient GMM
method by following Kelejian and Prucha’s (1998) procedure. In order to define the
GMM estimator, equation (4) is first rewritten as follows:

y = Zδ + u
With

(6)

u = λWu + ε

where Z = ( X, Wy ) and δ = ( β′,ρ′ )′ .The GMM method identifies δ by a moment
condition which is the orthogonality between the set of instruments H and the error term

u given by:
E ( H′u ) = 0

(7)

where H is defined as a subset of the linearly independent columns of ( X, WX, W 2 X ) . It
is assumed that the elements of H are uniformly bounded in absolute value. Besides, H is
full column rank non-stochastic instrument matrix (see Kelejian and Prucha (1999) for
the description of its prosperities). The GMM estimator is given by:

(

δˆ = Z λˆ ′Z λˆ
() ()

(

) Z( )′y( )
-1

λˆ

λˆ

(8)

)

−1
where Z λˆ = PH Z − λˆ WZ , y λˆ = y − λˆ Wy and PH = H ( H′H ) H′ . This is the result of
( )
( )

the third step in the three step generalized moment procedure suggested by Kelejian and
Prucha. In the first step, the parameter vector ( δ ) consisting of betas and rho [ β ′, ρ ′] is
estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS) using the instrument matrix H that consists
of a subset of X, WX, W 2 X , where X is the matrix that includes all control variables in
the model, and W is a weight matrix. The disturbance term in the model is computed by
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using the estimates for betas and rho ( ρ ) from the first step. In the second step, this
estimate of the disturbance term is used to estimate the autoregressive parameter lambda

(λ )

using Kelejian and Prucha’s generalized moments procedure. In the third step, a

Cochran-Orcutt-type transformation is done by using the estimate for lambda ( λ ) from
the second step to account for the spatial autocorrelation in the disturbance. The GS2SLS
estimators for betas and rho ( ρ ) are then obtained by estimating the transformed model
using ⎡⎣ X, WX, W 2 X ⎤⎦ as the instrument matrix as given in equation (8).

Data Types and Sources
The model is estimated using cross-sectional data for Appalachian counties. Descriptive
statistics of the variables of the model is given in Table 1. The dependent variable is
direct local government expenditure per capita. The data for the direct local government
expenditure comes from U.S. Bureau of Census. Population data from Bureau of the
Census and estimates are used to calculate the per capita local government expenditures.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Description

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

DGEX02

Direct Local Gov. Expenditure per Capita, 2002

7.84232

0.4929

6.6399

12.54322

WDGEX02 Spatial Lag of DGEX02

7.84624

0.2193

7.3985

8.96555

POPD

Population Density, per Square mile,2000

4.28811

0.9115

1.846

7.74918

POP5_15

Percent of Population of School Age,2000

2.92443

0.12

2.1748

3.22287

POP>65

Percent of Elderly population,2000

2.64571

0.2027

1.5476

3.20275

DFEG

Per capita Grants from Higher Gov'ts,2002

7.98688

0.3758

6.9829

10.1766

PCTAC

Per Capita Personal Income Tax,2000

5.91452

0.5299

4.5074

7.42253

PCPTAX

Per Capita Property Tax,2000

5.5236

0.616

3.912

7.36265

LTD

Long-term Debt by Local Gov'ts,2002

11728.4

71189.1

0

1368142

Direct federal government expenditure and grants per capita (DFEG), per capital
local income tax (PCTAX), property tax per capita (PCPTAX), long-term debt (LTD),
population density (POPD), percent of population between 5 and 17 years old
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(POP15_17), and percent of population above 65 years old (POP_65) are included in the
model as the conditioning variables. All these variables are obtained from U.S. Bureau of
the Census. Grants and income taxes variables are measures of the resources available to
local governments. Population density is measured as the ratio of county population to
total county land area in square miles. It is included in the model in order to capture the
possibility of potential congestion effects or economies of scale in the provision of local
public services. The demographic variables, POP5_17 and POP_65, are included to
account for the impacts of variation in age structures on the demand for local public
services in the county.

Empirical Results and Analysis
Table 2 presents the results from OLS, Maximum Likelihood, and Generalized
Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS) estimation of (3b), (3c), (3d) and (6),
respectively. Direct local government expenditure per capita of Appalachian counties for
2002 is used as the dependent variable. The exogenous variables of the models are for
2000. Since all the variables are measured in logs, the coefficients are interpreted as
elasticites. The weights matrix used is queen-based contiguity spatial weights matrix.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the OLS estimation of the restricted model (rho=0
and lambda = 0) or the conventional linear model of local public services determination.
This model is used to compute the test statistics for spatial dependence which are
summarized in Table 3 (see also Maps 1 & 2 in appendix). The results for the spatial lag
and for the spatial error model are given in column 3 and column 4 of Table 2,
respectively. The fit of the model is increased when spatial effects are included. The
proper measures of fit are the Log-Likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and
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TABLE 2: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Direct Local Government Expenditure
Per Capita)

RHO (ρ)

Non Spatial
Model
OLS Est.
-

LAMBDA(λ)

-

CONSTANT

2.992***
(0.508)
0.013
(0.015)
0.399***
(0.112)
0.104*
(0.062)
0.108***
(0.031)
0.257***
(0.054)
0.065
(0.043)
-8.27e-008
(1.57e-007)
19.35
p=0.000
8.78
p=0.27
37.96

POPD
POP5_17
POP_65
DFEG
PCTAX
PCPTAX
LTD
Jarque-Bera

Spatial Lag Model
LM Estimation
0.265***
(0.058)
1.456**
(0.592)
0.013
(0.015)
0.346***
(0.108)
0.079
(0.060)
0.117***
(0.030)
0.261***
(0.052)
0.018
(0.042)
-9.76e-008
(1.51e-007)

Spatial Error
Model
LM Estimation
0.410***
(0.061)
3.210***
(0.522)
0.016
(0.016)
0.305**
(0.120)
0.080
(0.063)
0.107***
(0.030)
0.300***
(0.061)
0.041
(0.053)
-1.422e-007
(1.45e-007)
-

Spatial Lag with Spatial
Error Model
GS2SLS Estimation
-0.113
(0.174)
0.125***
(0.008)
5.195***
(1.650)
0.099***
(0.030)
0.030
(0.221)
-0.076
(0.123)
0.197***
(0.060)
0.445***
(0.107)
-0122
(0.086)
0.35e-006
(0.305e-006)
-

Breusch10.88
16.02
Pagan
p=0.14
p=0.02
Log
47.74
57.20
Likelihood
Akaike inf.
-59.91
-77.48
-98.40
criterion
Schwarz
-27.63
-41.17
-66.12
criterion
Likelihood
19.57
38.49
Ratio
p=0.000
p=0.000
Observations
418
418
418
418
Note: figures in brackets are standard errors. * denotes significance at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and
*** is significant at 1%.

TABLE 3: DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX : Appalachia.GAL (row-standardized weights)
TEST
MI/DF
VALUE
PROB
Moran's I (error)
0.208024
7.0024957
0.0000000
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)
1
21.8573414
0.0000029
Robust LM (lag)
1
4.0357158
0.0445468
Lagrange Multiplier (error)
1
43.7157959
0.0000000
Robust LM (error)
1
25.8941704
0.0000004
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)
2
47.7515118
0.0000000
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Schwarz Criterion (SC). Compared to that of the OLS (37.96), the Log-Likelihood has
increased to 47.74 (for spatial lag) and to 57.20 (for spatial error). Both the AIC and SC
in both the spatial lag and the spatial error models have decreased in similar pattern
compared to the OLS, compensating the improved fit for the added variable. The fact that
spatial effects really matter in the specification of a model for the determination of local
public spending is further confirmed by the result of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The
LR test compares the null model (the restricted or no spatial effect) to the alternative (the
unrestricted, either the spatial lag or the spatial error) model. It is distributed as χ 2 with
one degree of freedom. The significant values of 19.57 and 38.49 confirm the strong
significance of the autoregressive coefficient for the spatial lag and the spatial error
models, respectively.
The insignificant values of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticty in the
error terms of the models also suggest that heteroskedasticty is not a problem. The error
terms, however, are not normally distributed as confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test
statistic. Given the finite sample data, it is hard to make inferences based on the
maximum likelihood estimators. Thus, discussion is based only on GS2SLS coefficients.
The results of the GS2SLS estimation of the full model (6) are presented in
column 5 of Table 2. When both the spatial effects (spatial lag and spatial error) are
included together in the full model, the spatial lag effect becomes negative and
insignificant (rho = -0.113) indicating that it just captures spuriously the spatial error
effect in the spatial lag model. The degree of correlation in the level of direct local public
expenditure per capita between neighboring counties is measured by rho (p). This copycat effect indicates that, although insignificantly, an increase in county j’s neighbors
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expenditure leads to a decrease in county j’s expenditures. This could be because of the
positive spillover effects of public services. Commuters, for example, use public
transportation, roads, recreation and cultural facilities in their working communities. Air
pollution controls and sewage treatment enhance the environmental quality of
neighboring jurisdictions, and educational and job training expenditures may lead to
productivity gain in workplaces outside the community. The existence of such positive
spillover effects in neighboring counties reduces the need to invest in similar public
services. This result also indicates that the “political agency – yardstick competition”
model is not relevant in explaining the spatial interactions among local governments in
Appalachia during the study period. The spatial error effect, however, is still positive and
highly significant (lambda = 0.125). This spatial effect measures the degree of correlation
between neighbors’ errors. This could simply be due to the fact that local governments
are hit by spatially auto-correlated shocks because of the geographic similarities of
counties in Appalachia.
The empirical results indicate a positive and significant effect of population
density on local public expenditure per capita, indicating that per capita local public
expenditure increases with population density (absence of economies of scale in the
provision of local public services). This could be because of the fact that the threshold to
exploit economies of scale in the provision of local public services has not yet reached.
The elasticity is about 0.10. The coefficients for the demographic variables (POP5_17)
and (POP_65) are insignificant although they have the expected signs. Normally, the
proportion of school-age population is expected to increase local public expenditures
whereas the proportion of the elderly is expected to decrease it.
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Direct federal government expenditure and grants (DFEG) has a statistically
significant effect on the level of local public expenditures. The estimated coefficient for
DFEG is 0.20. This is what is commonly called as ‘flypaper effect’ in the literature. The
effect of per capita income tax is found to be statistically significant. The elasticity is
about 0.44. Long-term debt and per capita property tax, however, are not significant.

Conclusions and Implications
To investigate the impacts of spatial spillover effects in the determination of local
public spending, a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbance is
developed. The model is estimated by Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares
(GS2SLS) estimator using county-level data from Appalachia for the 2002 fiscal year.
The conventional (non spatial) model of local public expenditure determination is also
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares estimator and the spatial lag as well as the spatial
error models by Maximum-Likelihood estimator.
On the basis of the OLS estimates, test statistics are developed in order to test the
existence of spatial lag or spatial error dependences in local public expenditure
determination. Moran’s I test statistic indicates the existence of spatial dependence in our
data set. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics further indicate that the spatial error
model is more appropriate than Moran’s I test statistic. Given the finite date set, it is hard
to consistently estimate this model by maximum likelihood estimator because the basic
assumption upon which the maximum likelihood estimation is based, normally
distributed error terms, is not fulfilled as indicated by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. Since
the GS2SLS estimator does not require a normal distribution on the error terms, it is more
efficient under this circumstance. Thus, analysis is based on the GS2SLS coefficients.
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It is found that counties in the study area are not engaged in strategic interaction
in the determination of local public expenditures. The coefficient for the spatial lag
dependent variable is negative but insignificant, indicating the ‘copy-cat’ effect is not
important. This result also indicates that the “political agency – yardstick competition”
model is not relevant in explaining the spatial interactions among local governments in
Appalachia during the study period. The coefficient for the spatial error variable is,
however, positive and highly significant. This show the positive interdependences in
local public expenditures through spatial error process, which could simply be because
the local governments at the county-level in Appalachia are hit by a common shock.
Coefficient estimates for the conditioning variables are similar to those found in
the literature. According to the empirical results, population density has positive and
significant effect on local public expenditure per capita. It is also found a positive and
strong ‘flypaper effect’ and a positive and significant effect of per capita income taxes on
per capita local public expenditure. The effects of the demographic variables and the
long-term government debt variable, however, are found to be insignificant.
The results are generally consistent with the findings of previous literature,
although most U.S. studies are done at the state level. The application of county-level
data to test the expenditure spillover effects in the determination of local public
expenditure is one of the contributions of this study. Knowledge of how governments at
the county-level behave with respect to the provision of local public services is vital for
fiscal sustainability. It is also essential to pool resources in order to finance the provision
of local public services with significant spillover effects.

24

References
Ahlin, A. and E. Johansson, 2001, “Individual Demand for Local Public Schooling:
Evidence from Swedish Survey Data,” International Tax and Public Finance

8(4): 331-351.
Anselin, L., 2001, “Spatial Econometrics,” In a Companion to Theoretical Econometrics,
edited by B. Baltagi, 310-330, Oxford, England: Blackwell
_________, L., 2003, “Spatial Externalities, Spatial Multipliers and Spatial
Econometrics,” International Regional Science Review, 26(2): 153-166.
________ and A. Bera, 1998, “Spatial Dependence in Linear Regression Models with An
Introduction to Spatial Econometrics,” In Handbook of Applied Economic

Statistics, edited by A. Ullah and D. E. Giles, 237-289, New York: Marcel
Dekker.
________, R. Flrax and M. Yoon, 1996, “Simple Diagnostic Tests for Spatial
Dependence,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26(1): 77-104.
Baicker, Katherine, 2005, “The Spillover Effects of State Spending,” Journal of Public

Economics, 89(3):529-544.
Bergstrom, Theodore C. and Robert P. Goodman, 1973, “Private Demands for Public
Goods,” American Economic Review, 63 (3): 280-296.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro, 1982, “Micro-Based
Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures,” Econometrica,

50 (5): 1183-1205.
Besley, Timothy and Anne C. Case, 1995, “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, TaxSetting and Yardstick Competition,” American Economic Review, 85(1) ;: 25-45.
Borcherding, Thomas E. and Robert T. Deacon, 1972, “The Demand for the Services of
Non-Federal Governments,” American Economic Review, 62 (5): 891-901.
Brazer, H.E., 1959, City Expenditures in the United States, National Bureau Economic
Research, Occasional Paper 66, New York.
Brueckner, Jan K., 1998, “Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local governments:
The Case of Growth Controls,” Journal of Urban Economics, 44(3): 438-468.

25

_____________, 2000, “A Tiebout/Tax-Competition Model,” Journal of Public

Economics, 77(2):285-306.
Canning, D. and Pedroni P., 1999, “Infrastructure and long-Run Economic Growth,” Paper
presented at the 1999 Econometric Society Summer Meeting, Madison, Wisconsin.

Charney, Alberta H., 1993, “Migration and the Public Sector: A Survey,” Regional
Studies, 27, 313-326.
Case, Anne C., Harvey S. Rosen and James R. Hines Jr., 1993, “Budget Spillovers and
Fiscal Policy Interdependence,” Journal of Public Economics, 52(3): 285-307.
Curie, J. and M. Yelowitz, 2000, Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?” Journal

of Public Economics 75(1):99-124.
Di Matteo, L. and R. Di Matteo, 1998, “Evidence of the Determinants of Canadian
Provincial Government Health Expenditures: 1965-1991,” Journal of Health

Economics 17(2): 209-227.
Duffy-Deno, K.T., (1998), “The Effect of Federal Wilderness on County Growth in the
Inter-mountain Western United States,” Journal of Regional Sciences,
Duffy-Deno, Kevin T. and Randall W. Eberts, 1991, “Public Infrastructure and Regional
Economic Development: A Simultaneous Equations Approach,” Journal of

Urban Economics 39: 329-343.
Falch, T. and J. Rattso, 1997, “ Political and Economic determinants of School Spending
in Federal States: Theory and Time-Series Evidence,” European Journal of

Political Economy 13: 299-314.
Fay, M., 2000, “ Financing the Future: Infrastructure Needs in Latin America, 2000-05,”
Finance, Private Sector Development, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin
America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank.
Figlio, David. N., Van.W. Kolpin and William.E. Reid, 1999, “Do States Play Welfare
Games?” Journal of Urban Economics, 46: 437-454.
Fisher, Ronald C. and John C. Navin, 1992, “State-Local Fiscal Behavior: An Analysis
Interjurisdictional Differences, 1962-1987,” Public Finance Quarterly, 20:433449.

26

Gable, Todd M., and Kathleen P. Bell, 2004, “Tradeoffs between Local Taxes and
Government Spending as Determinants of Business Location,” Journal of

Regional Sciences, 44(1):21-41.
Gerdtham, U-G., J. Sogaard, F. Jonsson and F. Andersson, 1992, “An Econometric
Analysis of Health care Expenditure: A Cross-Section of OECD Countries,”

Journal of Health Economics, 11: 63-84.
Hagemann, R.P. and G. Nicoletti, 1989, “aging Population: Economic Effects and
Implications for Public Finance,” OECD, Working Papers, No. 61.
Hansen, N.M., 1965, “The Structure and Determinants of Local Public Investment
Expenditures,” this Review, May, 150-162.
Hashmati, A., 2001, “On the Causality between GDP and Health Care Expenditure in the
Augmented Solow Growth Models,” Swedish Working Paper Series in
Economics and Finance, 423.
Hawley, A. H., 1957, “Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures
in Central Cities,” in P.K. Hatt and A.J.Reiss, Jr. (eds.), Cities and Society,
Revised, Glencoe, III: Free Press.
Heller, P., R. Hemming and P. Kalvert, 1986, “Aging and Social Policy in the Major
Industrial Countries, 1980-2025,” IMF Paper, No. 47.
Henderson, James M., 1968, “Local Government Expenditures: A Social Welfare
Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 50 (2): 156-163.
Hirsch, W.Z., 1959, “Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth and
Consolidation,” this Review, August, 232-241.
Kelejian, Harry H. and D.P. Robinson, 1993 “A suggested Method of Estimation for
Spatial Interdependent Models with Autocorrelated Errors, and an Application to
a County Expenditure Model,” Papers in Regional Sciences, 72 (3):297-312.
Kelejian, Harry H. and Ingram R. Prucha, 1998, “A Generalized Two-Stage Least
Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Spatial
Autoregressive Disturbances,” Journal of Real Estate, Finance and Economics,

17(1): 99-121.

27

Lee, Lung-Fei, 2003, “Best Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares Estimator for a Spatial
Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive Disturbances,” Econometric Reviews,

22, 307-335.
Leu, Robert E., 1986, “The Public-Private Mix and International Health Care Costs,” in
Culyer, A. J. and B. Jonsson (eds.), Public and Private Health Services, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 41-66.
Mackinnon, J.G., H. White, and R. Davidson, (1983), “Tests for Model Specification in
the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses: Some Further Results,” Journal of

Econometrics, 21: 53-70.
Marlow, M. L. and A.F. Shiers, 1999, “Do Law Enforcement Expenditures Crowd-Out
Public Education Expenditures?” Applied Economics 31(2): 255-266.
Newhouse, J.P., 1987, “Cross National Differences in Health Spending: What Do They
Mean?” Journal of Health Economics, 6, 159-162.
Newman, Robert, 1983, “Industry Migration and Growth in the South,” Review of

Economics and Statistics, 65: 76-86.
Ohls, James C. and Terence J. Wales, 1972, “Supply and Demand for State and Local
Services,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 54(4):424-430.
Painter, G. and K. Bae, 2001, “The Changing Determinants of State Expenditure in the
United States: 1965-1992,” Public Finance and Management 1(4): 370-392.
Randolph, S., Z. Bogetic and D. Hefley, 1996, “Determinants of Public Expenditure on
Infrastructure, Transportation and Communication,” Policy Research Working
Paper 1661, World Bank.
Saavedra, Luz A., 2000, “A Model of Wefare Competition with Evidence from AFDC,”

Journal of Urban Economics, 47(2): 248-279.
Sanz, Ismael and Fracisco J. Velazquez, 2002, “Determinants of the Composition of
Government Expenditure By Functions,” Working Paper 13/2002, European
Economy Group.
Snyder, J.M. and I. Yachovelev, 2000, “Political and Economic Determinants of
Government Spending on Social Protection Programs,” Working Paper,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April, 2000.
Wildasin, D., 1986, Urban Public Finance, Harwood Academic Publishers, New York.

28

Map 1: Global Spatial Autocorrelation and Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation:
Residual

Map 2: Global Spatial Autocorrelation and Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation:
Spatial Lag Dependent Variable
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